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ARTICLE
Nobody wins the victory taboo in just war theory
Cian O’Driscoll
School of Social and Political Science, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK
ABSTRACT
This article examines how scholars of the just war tradition think about the ethical
dilemmas that arise in the endgame phase of modern warfare. In particular, it
focuses upon their reticence to engage the idiom of ‘victory’. Why, it asks, have
scholars been so reluctant to talk about what it means to ‘win’ a just war? It
contends that, while just war scholars may have good reason to be sceptical
about ‘victory’, engaging it would grant them a more direct view of the critical
potentialities, but also the limitations, of just war reasoning.
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Introduction
How do wars end? There is an inﬂuential school of thought which contends
that while wars can be concluded in a myriad of ways, they are highly unlikely
to result in the outcome that most people will intuitively think of ﬁrst—a
decisive victory for one side, and an emphatic defeat for the other.1 Scholars
associated with this approach contend that wars are no longer likely to con-
clude with a clear winner and loser, but can instead be expected to drag on in a
ragged fashion to the point where it is diﬃcult to discern not just who won, but
whether the war is even over.2 The notion of victory, they conclude, is anachro-
nistic and of little salience to the realities of contemporary armed conﬂict.
Events in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya and elsewhere lend credence to this
perspective.3 This point of view is, however, at odds with the enduring ubiquity
of victory in elite discourse. While military historians and strategists dismiss the
idea of victory as hopelessly jejune, political and military leaders continue to
invoke it frequently and with just as much enthusiasm as ever.4
CONTACT Cian O’Driscoll Cian.odriscoll@glasgow.ac.uk University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK
1The key statement of this position is arguably: Dominic Tierney, The Right Way to Lose a War: America
in an Age of Unwinnable Conﬂicts (New York: Little, Brown and Company 2015).
2For example: Robert Mandel, ‘Deﬁning Postwar Victory’, in Jan Angstrom and Isabelle Duvesteyn
(eds.), Understanding Victory and Defeat in Contemporary War (Abingdon: Routledge 2007), 18.
3See: Gideon Rose, How Wars End: Why We Always Fight the Last Battle (New York: Simon & Schuster 2011).
4On the current ubiquity of victory talk in international relations: Cian O’Driscoll and Andrew R. Hom,
‘Introduction’, in Andrew R. Hom, Cian O’Driscoll, and Kurt Mills (eds.), Moral Victories: The Ethics of
Winning Wars (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2017), 2–3.
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My intention in this essay is to take the idea of victory seriously, and,
following this, to examine how, if at all, it ﬁts within the predominant
Western framework for thinking about the rights and wrongs of warfare,
the just war tradition. My argument, which I will develop over four sections,
is that, although scholars of the just war tradition appear to have good
reason for avoiding the idiom of victory, their failure to engage with it
blunts the tradition’s critical edge.
Section One introduces the just war tradition. Section Two details the
reluctance of just war scholars to grapple with the notion of victory. Section
Three examines the reasons behind this evasion, noting certain problems
that pertain to the general concept of victory, and others that are speciﬁc to
its relation to the ideal of just war. Squaring the circle, Section Four proﬀers
an argument for why, despite all the apparent problems it raises, scholars of
the just war tradition should engage the concept of victory. Finally, bringing
all of this together in the conclusion, I will make the case for both why
scholars should never forget that just war is just war, and why this is a
matter of some importance for anyone with an interest in War Studies.
The just war tradition
Just war is commonly associated today with Michael Walzer’s classic 1977
text, Just and Unjust Wars.5 This book advances three main arguments. The
ﬁrst, directed against those who profess that the law is silent when arms are
drawn, is that war is not a realm of necessity and therefore moral anarchy.6
Instead it is a social activity, and the actions of those who partake in it are
rightly amenable to ethical scrutiny and evaluation. The second argument is
that the norms that delimit the practice of warfare are crystallised in what
Walzer refers to as ‘just war theory’. According to Walzer, just war theory
comprises two modes of judgement. ‘War is always judged twice, ﬁrst with
reference to the reasons states have for ﬁghting, secondly with reference to
the means they adopt’, he writes. ‘The ﬁrst kind of judgement is adjectival in
character: we say that a particular war is just or unjust. The second is
adverbial: we say that the war is being fought justly or unjustly.’7 The
third argument is that the norms that are embedded in just war theory,
and which form the substance of both modes of judgement, require revision
if they are to accord with the values attested by the signatories to the UN
Charter and upon which the post-1945 international order rests.
Walzer was not, of course, the originator of just war theory. Rather, he was
drawing on a tradition of inquiry that can be traced back at least as far as the
5Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations – 5th edition (New
York: Basic Books 2015).
6Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 3.
7Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 21.
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fourth century CE political theology of Saint Augustine, and which later
involved such luminaries as Thomas Aquinas and HugoGrotius, among others.8
At the heart of this tradition is the dual conviction that while the use of military
force by political communities may be justiﬁed in certain circumstances, it must
be subject to moral regulation. These convictions are usually bracketed under
two Latinate headings that correspond to the two modes of judgement identi-
ﬁed by Walzer. The jus ad bellum comprises the categories of analysis that
people consult when seeking to determine what if any conditions might justify
the resort to war on the part of a community. It thus encompasses the familiar
concepts of just cause, proper authority, right intention, proportionality and last
resort. The jus in bello aggregates the precepts that limit the conduct of war.
These centre on the principles of discrimination and proportionality. While
there is a healthy consensus among scholars regarding the centrality of these
categories of analysis, they routinely disagree over how they should be deﬁned
and weighted relative to one another.
Although the tradition was not so long ago an obscure hobbyhorse kept
alive only by Catholic seminary schools and historians of international law, it
has experienced a revival in recent years.9 Academic interest in the just war
tradition has mushroomed since the publication of Just and Unjust Wars in
1977, with an upsurge in the number of universities teaching the subject,
more people writing books and articles about it and the emergence of a
specialist periodical, the Journal of Military Ethics, dedicated to servicing this
new cottage industry. Alongside this, the just war tradition has become a
staple on curricula at military academies the world over, and its precepts
written into military codes and strategic doctrines.10 Most interestingly,
however, its concepts and terminology have become increasingly promi-
nent in the speeches and statements of military and political leaders on the
topic of war. President Obama’s Nobel Peace Prize Address is an obvious
example of this phenomenon, but it is not unique to him; President George
W. Bush and his predecessors were also no strangers to the just war idiom.11
Conspicuous by its absence
As the literature on just war has grown in recent years, so too has the range
of topics it has addressed. Every nook and cranny of the various jus ad
8The origins of the tradition are disputed. Rory Cox, ‘Expanding the History of the Just War: The Ethics
of War in Ancient Egypt’, International Studies Quarterly 61/2 (2017), 371–84. On the development of
the tradition: Daniel Brunstetter and Cian O’Driscoll (eds.), Just War Thinkers: From Cicero to the 21st
Century (Abingdon: Routledge 2017).
9Michael Walzer, ‘The Triumph of Just War Theory (and the Dangers of Success)’, in Arguing About War
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press 2003), 3–22.
10Paul Robinson, Nigel de Lee, and Don Carrick (eds.), Ethics Education in the Military (Burlington, VT:
Ashgate 2008).
11See: Mark Totten, First Strike: America, Terrorism, and Moral Tradition (New Haven: Yale University
Press 2010), 80–83.
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bellum and jus in bello categories have been explored, and they have also
been extended to address emergent issues in international relations as well
as new military technologies and ways of waging war. Books and articles
have recently been published on, among other things, the ethics of non-
violent ways of conducting war, the use of force short of war, drone warfare,
the ethics of espionage, the limits of anticipatory defence, the continuing
utility of sovereignty as a baseline for moral reasoning about war, the ethical
challenges posed by the use of robotics and artiﬁcial intelligence in armed
conﬂict and the implications of new conceptions of spatiality for both jus ad
bellum and jus in bello categories.12 One topic that is conspicuous by its
absence is, however, victory.
At this point, scholars familiar with just war theory may query this claim
by pointing to two issues that have so far been overlooked. The ﬁrst is the
category of ‘reasonable chance of success’, which many scholars identify as
an integral component of the jus ad bellum framework.13 It stipulates that
the use of force should not be employed, even where it is otherwise
justiﬁed, in situations where it is likely to end in failure. As such it serves a
‘prudential’ function, obliging communities to refrain from the pursuit of
just but futile causes.14 The issue here is that the idiom of victory is
subsumed within a general ‘prudential calculation of the likelihood that
the means used will bring the justiﬁed ends sought.’15 A vague emphasis
on utilitarian calculations cast in the generic language of success, which is
neither deﬁned nor interrogated, thus forecloses more speciﬁc considera-
tions pertaining to the termination of war. Not only, then, does the principle
of ‘reasonable chance of success’ tell us little about victory, it replaces it with
platitudes.
The second issue requires more attention. It relates to the jus post bellum
framework. Conceived as a stand-alone category, the jus post bellum is a
recent addition to just war thinking. It was ﬁrst proposed by Michael J.
Schuck in a 1994 essay, ‘When the Shooting Stops: Missing Elements in Just
War Theory’, published in The Christian Century. Disgusted by the triumph-
alism displayed by the United States in the wake of the 1991 Gulf War—and
12Some notable recent publications include: Michael L. Gross and Tamar Meisels (eds.), Soft War: The
Ethics of Unarmed Conﬂict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017); George Lucas, Ethics and
Cyber Warfare: The Quest for Responsible Security in the Age of Digital Warfare (Oxford: Oxford
University Press 2017); James Pattison, Just and Unjust Alternatives to War (Oxford: Oxford
University Press 2018); and Amy Eckert, Outsourcing War: The Just War Tradition in the Age of
Military Privatization (New York: Cornell University Press 2015). This list is indicative rather than
exhaustive. It is intended to oﬀer a sense of the wide range of topics just war scholars have tackled in
recent years.
13Colin Gray and Keith Payne present it as ‘one of the six guidelines for the use of force provided by
the “just war” doctrine’. Colin S. Gray and Keith Payne, ‘Victory is Possible’, Foreign Policy 39 (1980),
16.
14James Turner Johnson, Morality and Contemporary Warfare (New Haven: Yale University Press 1999),
34.
15Johnson, Morality and Contemporary Warfare, 29.
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especially the jingoistic victory parade that members of the military top
brass (including General Norman Schwarzkopf) celebrated on Main Street,
Disneyland—Schuck argued that just war theory, as it then stood, oﬀered no
guidance for how communities should comport themselves in the aftermath
of war. He proposed that a new pole of just war reasoning, which he
christened the jus post bellum, should be formulated to meet this need.16
Schuck’s proposition received a warm response. A number of leading
scholars, including Alex J. Bellamy, Gary Bass, Brian Orend, Larry May, and
Eric Patterson, endorsed it, and set about acting upon it.17 Victory was, quite
literally, the pivot for these formulations. As May framed it, for instance, the
key question for jus post bellum theorists is ‘what diﬀerence should there be
between victors and vanquished in terms of post-war responsibilities?’18 On
a similar note, Bellamy submitted that one could approach the task of jus
post bellum theorising with either a minimalist or maximalist approach, a
distinction that turns on whether one assigns minor or extensive post-war
responsibilities to the victors for societies they have vanquished in
combat.19
Victory, then, functions as a threshold for jus post bellum deliberations.
Herein lies the rub. Victory is assumed as a point of departure rather than
interrogated by jus post bellum theorists. It is taken as a premise rather than
a substantive issue or matter for inquiry.20 This is reﬂected in a line from
Michael Walzer’s most recent essay on the topic: ‘I am going to assume the
victory of just warriors, and ask what their responsibilities are after victory.’21
The explanation for this is of course that the jus post bellum has not in fact
evolved as a framework designed to shed light on what we might term the
ethics of victory. In actual fact, it has evolved as a guide for reﬂecting upon
the rights and duties that victors obtain after victory has been attained by
one side over the other and the transition to peace has already begun.22
16Michael J. Schuck, ‘When the Shooting Stops: Missing Elements in Just War Theory’, Christian Century
(26 October 1994), 982–83.
17Alex J. Bellamy, ‘The Responsibilities of Victory: Jus Post Bellum and the Just War’, Review of
International Studies 34 (2008), 601–25; Gary Bass, ‘Jus Post Bellum’, Philosophy & Public Aﬀairs 32/4
(2004), 384–412; Brian Orend, ‘Jus Post Bellum’, Journal of Social Philosophy 31/1 (2000), 117–37; Larry
May, After War Ends: A Philosophical Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2012); Eric D.
Patterson (ed.), Ethics Beyond War’s End (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press 2012); and
Mark J. Allman and Tobias L. Winwright, After the Smoke Clears: The Just War Tradition and Post War
Justice (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis 2010).
18May, After War Ends, 1.
19Bellamy, ‘The Responsibilities of Victory’, 602.
20Cian O’Driscoll, ‘At All Costs and in Spite of All Terror? The Victory of Just War’, Review of International
Studies 41 (2015), 805–08. Also: Mona Fixdal, Just Peace: How Wars Should End (New York: Palgrave
2012), 17.
21Michael Walzer, ‘The Aftermath of War: Reﬂections on Jus Post Bellum’, in Eric D. Patterson (ed.), Ethics
Beyond War’s End (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press 2012), 37. Emphasis added.
22David Rodin, ‘Two Emerging Issues of Jus Post Bellum: War Termination and the Liabilities of Soldiers
for Crimes of Aggression’, in Carsten Stahn and Jan K. Kleﬀner (eds.), Jus Post Bellum: Towards a Law
of Transition from Conﬂict to Peace (The Hague: TMC Asser Press 2008), 53–77.
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There have recently been some attempts to correct for the omission of
victory from the jus post bellum framework, but there is as yet no systematic
body of work on the matter.23
When one sets the jus post bellum aside and turns to more general con-
temporary writings on just war, the situation is compounded. Victory is even
further outside the frame. Indeed, it hardly features at all in most just war texts,
even when scholars are ostensibly discussing how wars end. Walzer is a case in
point. He alludes to victory on several occasions in Just and Unjust Wars, and
while his remarks are in each case intriguing, they are also minimal and not
developed. Early in the text, for instance, he observes that the imperative to
achieve victory in a just war can, if unchecked, militate against an army’s
commitment to waging war in a just manner. As he puts it, the quest for
‘moral decency in battle and victory in war’ are at crossed purposes.24 Later,
he notes that the intended end of any just war must be victory, but then
immediately concedes that it can be diﬃcult to discern what this means in
practical terms. ‘A just war is one that is morally urgent to win, and a soldier
who dies in a just war does not die in vain … But if it is sometimes urgent to
win, it is not always clear what winning is.’25 These remarks are, to be sure, food
for thought, but Walzer, regrettably, does not expand on them.
Yet inmentioning victory in any kind of substantive sense, Walzer still goes far
further than most contemporary just war scholars. A review of the key works in
the ﬁeld reveals that standard practice is to refer to the termination of war in
terms of either a temporal break—the ‘ending’ or cessation of war—or the values
for which it is fought, typically construed in terms of a balance between justice,
peace, and order. Victory seldom features in such formulations. It is conspicuous
only by its absence. The opening statement of Mona Fixdal’s otherwise excellent
book, Just Peace: How Wars Should End, is typical in this regard:
How should wars end? … I hold that any morally acceptable outcome to a war
must strike a balance between the goals of justice and of peace. The war
should end in a ‘better state of peace’, a peace that is more just and stabler
than that which held before it began.26
Eric Patterson similarly sets out the desired endpoint of a just war in terms
of a harmony between order, justice and conciliation.27 The point in both
cases is not necessarily that their approach is wrong, nor even that they
23Four contributions stand out: Janina Dill (ed.), ‘Symposium on Ending Wars’, Ethics 125/3 (2015), 627–
780; Beatrice Heuser, ‘Victory, Peace, and Justice: The Neglected Trinity’, Joint Forces Quarterly 69
(2013), 1–7; Gabriella Blum, ‘The Fog of Victory’, European Journal of International Law 24/1 (2013),
391–421; and Hom, O’Driscoll, and Mills, Moral Victories.
24Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 48; also 31–32.
25Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 110.
26Fixdal, Just Peace, 1. Fixdal (fn.1) attributes the phrase ‘better state of peace’ to Basil Liddell Hart and
Michael Walzer.
27Eric D. Patterson, Ending Wars Well: Order, Justice, and Conciliation in Contemporary Post-Conﬂict (New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press 2012).
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have selected the wrong values to emphasise. It is simply that victory is
nowhere to be found in either formulation. It has been deftly and eﬀectively
circumnavigated. The purpose of this article is to consider whether this is
the right strategy. Towards this end, it will consider the possibly that these
approaches might be enriched by bringing them into dialogue with the
concept of victory.
Why is victory a bad word?
Before turning to why it would be a good thing for just war scholars to engage
the concept of victory, it is ﬁrst necessary to devote a few words to thinking
about why they have not done so already. Why, in other words, has victory
become a taboo subject for just war scholars? A brief discussion of a landmark
publication in the ﬁeld provides a way into this question.
Larry May’s 2012 monograph, After War Ends: A Philosophical Perspective, is
the book in question.28 As the title suggests, After War Ends comprises a
philosophical engagement with the jus post bellum component of just war
reasoning. It is the most comprehensive monograph available on ethics at the
end of war today and is a very impressive, high-quality piece of work. What I
would like to focus on here, however, is how the text is framed. The scope of
the book—and indeed of the jus post bellum, as introduced by May—is
deﬁned by reference to a temporal demarcation: afterwar ends. This approach
raises several red ﬂags. Are terms like ‘before’, ‘during’ and ‘after’ helpful when
it comes to speaking about war? Or is their tidy sequencing out of synch with
the messiness of what they purport to describe? And how could one tell when
or even whether a war had truly ended? It seems to me at least that this is a
very sandy bottom in which to anchor jus post bellum analysis.
Would it not be a better idea, one wonders, to peg jus post bellum analysis
more ﬁrmly to the idea of victory, rather than that of the ending of war? This
would have the positive eﬀect of tying jus post bellum reasoning to the strategic
rationale of war-ﬁghtingwhile also (one could hope) avoiding the kind of spongy
thinking that a reliance on terms such as ‘after’ encourages. Scholars of the just
war tradition have been very resistant to this proposal. The concept of victory,
they argued, has no proper place in just war thinking. The reasons they gave for
this are instructive, and can be helpfully lumped into two brackets, each of which
maps onto a broader set of concerns. Together they tell us something about why
just war scholars have hitherto neglected the concept of victory.
The ﬁrst bracket encompassed problems that are inherent to the concept
of victory itself. These problems stemmed from the fact that victory turns
out to be just as spongy a concept as ‘after’, and equally diﬃcult to deﬁne.
Interestingly, this observation is not merely an outsider’s prejudice, but is
28See fn. 17.
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shared by those who have spent time studying and writing about victory.
Thus Robert Mandel, the author of The Meaning of Military Victory, describes
it as a ‘fuzzy, contentious, and emotionally charged’ concept, while Richard
Hobbs variously describes it as an ‘elusive phantom’ and a ‘mysterious and
enticing shadow’.29 The suggestion in both cases is that victory is an
inherently nebulous concept that eludes easy deﬁnition.30 While strategists
might follow Carl von Clausewitz in insisting that victory is achieved by
thwarting one’s opponents in battle and imposing one’s will upon them, it is
not clear exactly what it signiﬁes, or how one would identify whether or
when it has been achieved in practice.31
The case of Iraq is an illuminating reference point. Allied forces secured a
decisive military victory over the Iraqi Army in the 1991 Gulf War, but the
survival of Saddam Hussein’s Ba’athist regime and its subsequent refusal to
accept the verdict of battle led observers to discount this victory as ‘hollow’.32
Twelve years later, when a US-led coalition invaded Iraq, ousted Hussein, and
seized control of Baghdad, it appeared to many that the promise of victory,
frustrated in 1991, had ﬁnally been realised. The sight of President George W.
Bush aboard the U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln declaring ‘Mission accomplished’
supported this view.33 Yet ﬁghting continued for many years after, and the
fate of Iraq is still uncertain today—facts that led many people to query
whether victory had ever been achieved in the ﬁrst place. The words of Phil
Klay, a short story writer who served in Iraq during the surge, capture some-
thing of this ambiguity: ‘Success was amatter of perspective. In Iraq it had to be.
There was no Omaha Beach, no Vicksburg Campaign, not even an Alamo to
signal a clear defeat. The closest we’d come were those toppled Saddam
statues, but that was years ago.’34
This belies that there is no obvious way of discerning whether and when
victory has been won in wars like that in Iraq.35 There is no consensus, for
29Robert Mandel, The Meaning of Military Victory (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 2006), 13; and Richard
Hobbs, The Myth of Victory: What is Victory in War? (Boulder, CO: Westview 1979), xvi, 2.
30This impression is supported by the fact that attempts to deﬁne victory frequently descend into
typologies that distinguish diﬀerent kinds or levels of victory (e.g., tactical, strategic, political,
military, etc.). See: William C. Martel, Victory in War: Foundations of Modern Military Policy
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2007); and Brian Bond, The Pursuit of Victory: From
Napoleon to Saddam Hussein (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1996).
31Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University
Press 1989), 1.
32Jeﬀrey Record, Hollow Victory: A Contrary View of the Gulf War (Washington, DC: Brassey’s 1993).
33President George W. Bush, ‘President Bush Announces Major Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended,
1 May 2003’. Available at: https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/05/
20030501–15.html. Accessed: 16 July 2017.
34Phil Klay, Redeployment (New York: Penguin, 2014), p. 77.
35On this: Dominic P. Johnson and Dominic Tierney, Failing to Win: Perceptions of Victory and Defeat in
International Politics (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2006); Jan Angstrom, ‘The United
States Perspective on Victory in the War on Terrorism’, in Jan Angstrom and Isabelle Duvesteyn (eds.),
Understanding Victory and Defeat in Contemporary War (Abingdon, Routledge, 2007): 94–113; and
General Tommy Franks, ‘The Meaning of Victory: A Conversation with Tommy Franks’, The National
Interest 86 (November 2006): 8.
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instance, over the right metrics to employ in this kind of determination. At
various times in the past, armies have used diﬀerent markers to gauge whether
or not victory had been won. Greek poleis equated victory with driving the
enemy army from the battleﬁeld, while later societies associated it with, among
other things, the annexation of territory, the capture of the adversary’s capital
city, a superior body-count, regime change and the winning of hearts and
minds.36 The point to glean from this is that victory is just as diﬃcult to identify
in concrete terms as it is to deﬁne in the abstract.
Going beyond this, some scholars claim that the problem is not simply
that victory is diﬃcult to deﬁne or identify in practice, it is that is not a
realistic outcome in contemporary armed conﬂict. The nature of modern
warfare is not amenable to clear-cut endings, they argue, but instead tends
to produce drawn-out endgames.37 Russell Weigley is the main exponent of
this view. He contends that, except for the period bookended by the battles
of Breitenfeld and Waterloo, wars have seldom generated emphatic
victories.38 Rather, they grind on without anybody ever actually winning.
To paraphrase Oﬃcer Pryzbylewski from the critically acclaimed HBO televi-
sion series, The Wire: Nobody wins, it’s just that one side loses more slowly
than the other. The development of modern ways of waging war, and the
advent of the War on Terror, have compounded this problem.39 It is hard to
win a decisive victory when wars are conﬁgured in such a way that they lack
a clearly demarcated battleﬁeld and are structured, not around the quest for
pitched combat, but around strategic doctrines like the Israeli Defence
Force’s commitment to ‘mowing the lawn’.40
The second bracket included problems pertaining to the appropriate-
ness of using the term victory in relation to just war. The concern here
was that victory is a retrograde concept that evokes forms of triumph-
alism and adversarialism that are at odds with the ethos of the just war
tradition. According to this way of thinking, appeals to victory engender
a crude win-at-all-costs mentality that undercuts the premium just war
thinking places on moderation and restraint.41 Prime Minister Winston
36On this point: Leo J. Blanken, Hy Rothstein, and Jason J. Lepore (eds.), Assessing War: The Challenge of
Measuring Success and Failure (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2015).
37Tierney, The Right Way to Lose a War; Michael Mandelbaum, Mission Failure: America and the World in
the Post-Cold War Era (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).
38Russell F. Weigley, The Age of Battles: The Quest for Decisive Warfare from Breitenfeld to Waterloo
(London: Pimlico, 1991).
39As General David Petraues remarked of the global war against Al Qaeda, ‘this is not the sort of
struggle where you take a hill, plant the ﬂag, and go home with a victory parade.’ Mark Tran,
‘General David Petraeus Warns of Long Struggle Ahead for US in Iraq’, Guardian, 11 September 2008.
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/sep/11/iraq.usa. Accessed: 16 July 2017.
40Efraim Inbar and Eitan Shamir, ‘“Mowing the Grass”: Israel’s Strategy for Protracted Intractable
Conﬂict’, Journal of Strategic Studies 37/1 (2014), 65–90.
41On this point: Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 47–48; also: Augustine, City of God against the Pagans, ed.
by R. W. Dyson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1998), 109–13; 118–23. For analysis: Philip
Wynn, Augustine on War and Military Service (Minneapolis: Fortress Press 2013), 265–77.
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Churchill provided an example of this in a speech on Allied war objec-
tives delivered to the House of Commons in May 1940: ‘What is our
aim? I can answer in one word: victory – victory, victory at all costs,
victory in spite of all terror; victory however long and hard the road
may be; for without victory, there is no survival.’42 The situation in
which Churchill’s United Kingdom found itself was not unique. It is
not unusual for societies waging ostensibly just wars to ﬁnd themselves
between a rock and hard place, whereby they and their just cause stand
to be defeated unless they abandon customary jus in bello restraints
and learn to ﬁght dirty. The choice in such instances is between win-
ning a just war and waging it justly; it is diﬃcult, it seems, to do both.43
References to victory also, it is claimed, appear callous and insensi-
tive when applied to modern war. How can it be proper to speak about
winning, the argument goes, when the issue at hand is mechanised
slaughter? As Kenneth Waltz put it: ‘Asking who won a given war,
someone has said, is like asking who won the San Francisco earthquake.
… In wars there is no victory but only varying degrees of defeat.’44
Aristide Briand similarly observed: ‘In modern war there is no victor.
Defeat reaches out its heavy hand to the uttermost corners of the earth,
and lays its burdens on victor and vanquished alike.’45 Indeed, even
Churchill, who (see above) had committed the UK to pursue victory at
all costs, later conceded that the outcome of the war exposed the
hollowness of such talk: ‘Both sides, victors, and vanquished, were
ruined.’46 The inference in each case is that modern war, whether just
or unjust, is suﬃciently ghastly in terms of its destructiveness that the
prospect of ever ‘winning’ it rings hollow.47 As it is articulated in Spoils,
a recent novel that tackles the 2003 Iraq War, ‘even if you win, you
lose.’48 It was precisely this point that Michael Schuck, provoked by the
sight of generals celebrating the tragedy of the Gulf War as if it were a
triumph, wished to make when he initially proposed the jus post bellum
framework.
42Quoted in: Bond, The Pursuit of Victory, 142.
43Andrew Fiala has expressed this idea in very simple terms: ‘There is an irresolvable tension between
the demands of morality and the need to win.’ Andrew Fiala, The Just War Myth: The Moral Illusions of
War (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littleﬁeld 2008), 6.
44Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia University Press
2001), 1.
45Quoted in: Hobbs, The Myth of Victory, 477.
46Winston Churchill, The World Crisis, Volume V: The Unknown War (London: Bloomsbury 2015), 1.
47There is an interview with Bao Ninh, a veteran of the North Vietnamese Army, in the 2017 Ken Burns
and Lynn Novick documentary, The Vietnam War, that bears reference here. ‘People sing about
victory … They’re wrong. Who won and who lost is not a question. In war, no one wins or loses.
There is only destruction.’ Quoted in: Christopher J. Finlay, Is Just War Possible? (Cambridge: Polity
2018), 55.
48Brian van Reet, Spoils (London: Jonathan Cape 2017), 199.
10 C. O’DRISCOLL
No substitute for victory?
The arguments against victory are, it would appear, compelling. They force
one to think twice about both the utility and aptness of speaking about
modern war in terms of ‘winning’. Yet I think there is also much that these
arguments miss. I want to focus here on three important and closely related
matters that, when taken seriously, put a very diﬀerent complexion on
matters.
The ﬁrst matter bears on the role that victory plays in how we typically
tend to think about war. While international lawyers may prefer to address
war in terms of diﬀerent sequential stages (i.e., before, during and after) that
correspond to diﬀerent bodies of law, pundits and practitioners alike com-
monly associate it with the quest for victory. As General Douglas MacArthur
famously put it, ‘War’s very object is victory … In war there is no substitute
for victory.’49 Variations on this theme have been sounded by ﬁgures from
Aristotle and Sun Tzu to Presidents George W. Bush and Donald Trump.50 It
has also been enshrined in strategic thinking, most notably in the Powell-
Weinberger doctrine.51 War poets from Robert Southey (‘After Blenheim’) to
Wilfred Owen (‘Smile, Smile, Smile’) have also echoed it, and it has even
been cast in stone in the motto carved above the entrance to France’s most
famous military academy, Saint Cyr.52 It is also expressed in no uncertain
terms by the chief protagonist in Spoils, the Iraq War novel mentioned
earlier. ‘We should play to win’, Private Cassandra, the protagonist, tells
her commanding oﬃcer.53 This matters insofar as it suggests that when
proponents of just war discourse avoid the language of victory, they dis-
tance themselves from how the people who command and wage wars think
about them. This has implications for the ability of those same just war
scholars to speak truth to power.
49General Douglas MacArthur, ‘Farewell Address to Congress, 19 April 1951’. Available at: http://www.
americanrhetoric.com/speeches/douglasmacarthurfarewelladdress.htm. Accessed: 16 July 2017.
50Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. by Harris Rackham (London: Wordsworth Classics 1996), 3;
Marcus Tullius Cicero, The Republic and The Laws, trans. by Niall Rudd (Oxford: Oxford University
Press 1998), 83; Sun Tzu is quoted in: Mark R. McNeilly, Sun Tzu and the Art of Modern Warfare
(Oxford: Oxford University Press 2015), 16; Bush is quoted in: Angstrom, ‘The United States
Perspective on Victory’, 98; and Trump is quoted in: Andrew R. Hom and Cian O’Driscoll, ‘Can’t
Lose for Winning: Victory in the Trump Presidency’, The Disorder of Things Blogspot, 24 January 2017.
Available at: https://thedisorderofthings.com/2017/01/24/cant-lose-for-winning-victory-in-the-trump-
presidency/. Accessed: 16 July 2017.
51Caspar Weinberger, ‘The Uses of Military Power’. Available at: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/front
line/shows/military/force/weinberger.html. Accessed: 28 May 2015.
52John I. Alger, The Quest for Victory: The History of the Principles of War (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press
1982), 173. The remarks of Sebastian Junger, a journalist who spent 15 months embedded with a US
platoon at a remote outpost in Afghanistan, are also worth noting: ‘Much of modern military tactics
is geared toward maneuvering the enemy into a position where they can essentially be massacred
from safety. It sounds dishonourable only if you imagine that modern war is about honour; it’s not.
It’s about winning’. Sebastian Junger, War (New York: Twelve 2011), 140.
53Van Reet, Spoils, 42.
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There is also a case to be a made that some level of engagement with the
language of victory might remind scholars that ‘just war is also just war’.54
Put more plainly, it would check the growing tendency to sanitise just war
by speaking about it in terms that obscure its brutish realities.55 Just wars
are strategically directed violent enterprises that produce winners and
losers; it would not be a bad thing for people to remember this. Not only
would it refresh them of the stakes, it would also perhaps have the addi-
tional beneﬁt of encouraging just war scholars to factor the strategic dimen-
sions of warfare into their deliberations. So even if it is beset with diﬃculties,
there are good pragmatic reasons why just war scholars should engage the
language of victory.
The second matter is really an extension of the ﬁrst. It speaks to the role
that the concept of victory can play in focusing just war scholars on the
utility of warfare, that is to say, on the good that it stands to accomplish in
any given instance oﬀset against the blood and treasure it is likely to cost.
The words of two very diﬀerent thinkers on war provide guidance here. We
start with Clausewitz, who declared that no one ought to start a war without
ﬁrst being clear about what victory would comprise and how it could be
obtained.56 And we move from there to the sixteenth century humanist,
Erasmus of Rotterdam, and in particular the advice he oﬀered to Christian
princes tasked with deciding whether or not to take their kingdoms to war.
‘Let him apply just a little reason to the problem’, Erasmus counselled, by
‘counting up the true cost of the war and deciding whether the object he
seeks to achieve by it is worth that much, even if he were certain of victory,
which does not always favour even the best of causes.’57 Combining these
sentiments, we arrive at the idea that victory can serve as a focal concept for
thinking about what exactly we hope or expect a just war to deliver—and at
what price.
The third matter reverses the lens by providing a framework for scholars
to think, not just about the costs of victory, but about the rewards that
properly follow from it. The question that arises here is: What rights or legal
consequences does (or should) victory in war generate? Medieval writers
such as Gratian provide direction here. Gratian and his successors assumed a
distinction between just and unjust wars in respect of this matter. As James
Brundage explains, they held that ‘Property captured and appropriated in a
just war was rightfully taken and … title to it legitimately passed to the
victor. … Rights to tangible property and intangible rights might both be
54Ken Booth, ‘Ten Flaws of Just Wars’, The International Journal of Human Rights 4/3 (2000), 316–17.
55As Walzer has remarked, some just war scholars seem to have forgotten that the object of their
inquiry is war. Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 335–36.
56Clausewitz, On War, 579.
57Erasmus, The Education of a Christian Prince, ed. by Lisa Jardine (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press 1997), 103.
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won in a just war, but not in an unjust war.’58 Later, in the seventeenth
century, legal theorists such as Hugo Grotius and Samuel von Pufendorf
would complicate matters even further by inquiring as to whether victory in
war created new legal rights for the winning party or merely vindicated pre-
existing ones.59 By engaging the concept of victory, then, scholars may
acquire greater traction on questions pertaining to the spoils of just wars,
and thus open up a new approach to jus post bellum reasoning.
This brings me to the culmination of my argument. Bringing the concept
of victory into play re-connects just war reasoning to its own critical edge by
forcing scholars to be ‘honest in their just war thinking’.60 It does so by
compelling these scholars to grapple with the question of what the recourse
to war can do for a given society in any particular case and whether it is ever
worth the misery it sews. Pitched in these terms, rather than in the gentler
discourse of justice and peace (as per Fixdal), or peace, justice and reconci-
liation (as per Patterson), the gravity of embarking on a just war becomes
fully apparent. The scholar, if he or she is so minded, may trial this approach
out by asking which if any just wars delivered an incontrovertible victory
that was both worthy of the name and worth the toll it exacted. Very few
wars, I wager, would pass this test. Accordingly, rather than surrendering
just war thinking to a retrograde logic, as critics have suggested, bringing
the concept victory more ﬁrmly into play would lend it greater stringency
and thereby give it a sharper critical edge.
It might of course be objected that this is not an especially radical
proposal. There is some truth to this. Even setting aside the debate about
‘reasonable chance of success’ canvased in Part Two of this article, the
principle of jus ad bellum proportionality ostensibly already covers the role
earmarked here for victory. The argument here, however, is that if we are
serious about proportionality, we must connect it not just to conversations
about body-counts or the defence of values, or to eﬀecting a balance
between good and harm, but to discussions of the kind of victory we wish
to see achieved and their limitations.61 This would prevent just war scholars
58James A. Brundage, ‘Holy War and Medieval Lawyers’, in Thomas Patrick Murphy (ed.), The Holy War
(Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press 1976), 109.
59See: Stephen C. Neﬀ, War and the Law of Nations: A General History (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press 2005), 137–40. Also: Sharon Korman, The Right of Conquest (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1996).
60John Howard Yoder, When War is Unjust: Being Honest in Just War Thinking – Revised Edition
(Maryknoll, NY: Orbis 1996).
61The literature on proportionality mostly ignores the issue of victory. For example, the key paper in
the ﬁeld does not make a single reference to the notion of victory or winning. Thomas Hurka,
‘Proportionality in the Morality of War’, Philosophy & Public Aﬀairs 33/1 (2005), 34–46. A later paper
by Gary Brown only notes that ‘Proportionality does not preclude waging war to win.’ Gary D. Brown,
‘Proportionality and Just War’, Journal of Military Ethics 2/3 (2003), 173. There are of course
exceptions. Michael Walzer’s statement on proportionality as it applied to the 2008–09 Gaza War
is a case in point. Michael Walzer, ‘The Gaza War and Proportionality’, Dissent Magazine, 8 January
2009. Available at: https://www.dissentmagazine.org/online_articles/the-gaza-war-and-proportional
ity. Accessed: 16 July 2017.
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from falling into the trap of treating war as a bloodless abstraction and
remind them of exactly what is at stake. A stanza from the aforementioned
poem by Wilfred Owen, ‘Smile, Smile, Smile’, illuminates this point: ‘Peace
would do wrong to our undying dead/The sons we oﬀered might regret
they died/If we got nothing lasting in their stead./We must all be solidly
indemniﬁed./Though all be worthy Victory which all bought.’62
An alternative objection is that the motive behind factoring the concept
of victory explicitly into moral reﬂection on war is to undercut the very idea
of just war. By highlighting the costs associated with victory and under-
scoring the probability that any ‘victory’ achieved will likely be partial at
best, it is true that this approach is more rather than less stringent when it
comes to sanctioning the recourse to war. This, one might respond, is
exactly how it ought to be. But—and it is important to be clear on this
point—this approach does not preclude the possibility of just wars. It
acknowledges that war may be justiﬁed in certain circumstances. It should
not, then, be discounted as a form of paciﬁsm-by-the-back-door. Its aim is
not to endorse the kind of reasoning that James Turner Johnson has pillor-
ied under the pejorative label jus contra bellum.63 Rather it is to encourage
just war scholars to bear in mind both the limits of what can be achieved by
the use of force in any instance, and the suﬀering it necessarily brings. As
such, it is oﬀered as a means, not only by which just war thinking might be
kept honest, but also as a contribution to protecting against what Reinhold
Niebuhr described as ‘the ironic tendency of virtues to turn into vices when
too complacently relied upon; and of power to become vexatious if the
wisdom which directs it is trusted too conﬁdently.’64
Conclusion
In this essay, I have presented a simple argument that challenges the resistance
of modern just war scholars to the concept of victory. While I have acknowl-
edged the (good) reasons why scholars maywish to avoid the notion of victory,
I also argue that engaging it would grant them a more direct view of the
limitations of just war and what it can achieve in any given instance. As such,
taking victory into account would remind them of the well-worn adage that
‘just war is just war’, and the importance of always remembering this when
making judgements about the rights and wrongs of the use of force. There is,
however, a twist here. Wheremost scholars who invoke the idea that ‘just war is
just war’ do so in a bid to discredit the whole enterprise of just war thinking, my
62Wilfred Owen, ‘Smile, Smile’ Smile’, in Anthem for Doomed Youth (London: Penguin 2015), 17.
63James Turner Johnson, ‘The Broken Tradition’, The National Interest 45 (1996), 28. Also: Serena K.
Sharma, ‘The Legacy of Jus Contra Bellum: Echoes of Paciﬁsm in Contemporary Just War Thought’,
Journal of Military Ethics 8/3 (2009), 217–30.
64Reinhold Niebuhr, The Irony of American History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 2008), 133.
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conclusion is that it is rather the basis upon which that enterprise properly
rests.65 For it is only by keeping in mind the base realities of the ‘war’ in ‘just
war’ that just war scholars can hope to make the right calls and reach the right
judgements. The irony of this is that the incorporation of victory into just war
deliberations will thus render it a less rather than more triumphalist discourse,
and, conversely, a more rather than less critical resource.
There is, however, another side to this argument that I have so far
avoided. This is the idea that if just war scholars will ﬁnd their eﬀorts
enriched by the language of victory, scholars interested in victory might
similarly beneﬁt from tapping into the bank of ideas supplied by the just
war tradition. By connecting the examination of victory to the principles of
justice, peace and order that animate the just war tradition, scholars in this
ﬁeld may discover new ways of thinking about what has hitherto been cast
in terms of a relation between ‘military victory’ and ‘political victory’.66 This,
however, is a task for another day. In the meantime, it is appropriate to
conclude on the sombre note struck by events in Mosul, where the Iraqi
army’s victory over the Islamic State has recently turned vicious.67
Lamentably, these dismal developments underscore both the gravity and
urgency of the matters discussed in this essay.
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